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Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, Inc.:
Nonaccess to U.S. Courts by Unrecognized
Governments - A New Exception?
As a general rule, unrecognized foreign governments and their in-
strumentalities are not granted access to U.S. courts., Recently, how-
ever, in Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, Inc. ,2 the United States
District Court for Delaware refused to follow the general rule, or to apply
one of the recognized exceptions3 to the rule. Instead, a juridical entity
of the Ministry of Angola was granted standing to sue at a time when the
People's Republic of Angola (Angola) maintained no diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States.4 Thus, the Ronair decision may represent
the creation of a new exception to the general rule of nonaccessibility.
Transportes Aereos de Angola (TAAG), which was organized under
the laws of Angola and had its principal place of business in Angola, 5
brought suit against two U.S. corporations, Jet Traders Investment Cor-
poration (Jet Traders), and Ronair, Inc. (Ronair), for breach of contract
in the sale of a Boeing aircraft. TAAG had entered into a written agree-
ment to purchase the aircraft from Jet Traders, who then contracted to
buy the plane from Tekair, Ltd. (Tekair). Title was held by the other
defendant, Ronair, who had contracted to sell the aircraft to Tekair.
Tekair never delivered the aircraft to Jet Traders leaving Jet Traders
unable to meet its contractual obligations to TAAG.
After the delivery date had passed and TAAG had not received its
aircraft, TAAG tendered written notice to Jet Traders that it was termi-
nating the contract and initiated suit against Ronair and Jet Traders.
Ronair moved to dismiss the complaint, basing its motion on a series of
decisions that had refused litigant status to unrecognized governments
and their instrumentalities. 6 Jet Traders moved to dismiss for lack of in
See, e.g., Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977); Federal
Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1970),af d, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
1973),cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974); Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics v. Cibrario,
235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923).
2 544 F. Supp. 858 (D.C. Del. 1982).
3 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Amtorg Trading
Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934); Upright v. Mercury Business Machines
Co., 13 A.D.2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961).
4 544 F. Supp. at 861. See also infia note 84.
5 544 F. Supp. at 861.
6 Id. See, e.g., Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977); Federal
Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), at'd, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
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personam jurisdiction. 7 The district court dismissed both motions and
allowed TAAG's action to proceed.
To understand the district court's holding, it is necessary to under-
stand the process of recognizing foreign governments and to review the
history of excluding unrecognized governments and their instrumentali-
ties from U.S. courts.
Generally, " '[r]ecognition' refers to either the formal act or the con-
tinuing relationship established by the act of recognition between the
recognizing state and the entity or regime recognized." 8 Under interna-
tional law, the recognition of a foreign state or government is exclusively
a political function. 9 A country has neither a duty to grant nor a right to
receive recognition.' 0 A new state or government will usually send a for-
mal communication requesting recognition, which may be granted by
the issuance of either a written or oral proclamation, or by implication. I"
Once recognized, the foreign state or government acquires legal capacity
to sue in U.S. courts, and may assert a right for itself and its property to
be immune from suit.
12
In the United States, it is well-settled that the courts are precluded
from determining or affecting recognition of a foreign state or govern-
ment. 13 The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Pink 14 held
that the President has exclusive authority to recognize and engage in
diplomatic relations with foreign sovereigns.15 Thus, the courts are con-
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974). See also Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978); Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
7 Jet Traders' motion to dismiss was denied because the Delaware statute provided for
personal jurisdiction. 544 F.2d at 864-66. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (Supp. 1982).
8 Note, The Impact of Constitutive Recogntion on the Right to Self-Determination." An Analysis of
United States Recognition Practices Utiizing the Chinese Question as a Guide, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 123,
123 (1979). See generall H. BRIGGS, THE LAw OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND NOTES
99-193 (2d ed. 1952); 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-108 (2d ed.
1973); 1 G. 1-IACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-387 (1944); H. LAUTERPACHT,
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947); 1 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
67-248 (1906); M. SORENSON, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 266-90 (1968); 2 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-753 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 94-114 (1965).
9 Alder, The Unrecognieed Government in the Courts of the United States, 5 VA. J. INT'L L. 36, 36
(1964).
IO Id. See generally H. LAUTERPACHT,supra note 8 (Lauterpacht's thesis that there is a right
and duty to recognize has not been accepted); Cf. 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 1-37.
1 Note, supra note 8, at 123.
12 Alder, supra note 9, at 36. See I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (H. Lauter-
pacht 8th ed. 1955); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-10; Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
13 Alder, supra note 9, at 36.
14 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
15 See id. at 223-26. The authority had been recognized previously in .the leading case of
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) ("Political recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive."); Cf.
Note, Access to Courts byjuristic Entities Created by Unrecognized Governments. Federal Repubh of Ger-
many v. Ehiofon, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155, 159 (1973):
[T]his rule is not adhered to closely, although in practice courts will, at least, pay
lip service to executive prerogative. In the first place, the notion that recognition
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strained to recognize the sovereignty of a politically recognized govern-
ment and accept the validity of its acts.16
Traditionally, two kinds of recognition may be granted: defaclo and
dejure.17 De facto recognition implies a willingness to maintain consular
or diplomatic contacts, however limited, and is usually given during a
transitional period of a territory, when there is a lack of confidence in the
new government's stability.'8 De facto recognition is more tentative and
less committal than dejure recognition.19 De Jure recognition implies a
preparedness for normal diplomatic relations and is the fullest type of
recognition. 20 In addition, dejure recognition demonstrates confidence in
the stability of the government and the State, the expectation that inter-
national obligations will be met, and a willingness to maintain normal
diplomatic relations. 21
It is through the process of recognition that a state becomes an inter-
national person,2 2 able to enjoy the benefits of membership in the inter-
national community and friendly relations with the United States.23
Recognition . . . once given cannot be withdrawn while that govern-
ment continues in power. The act of severing diplomatic relations does
not withdraw recognition but merely deprives the foreign state of the
benefit of friendly relations with the United States. [The government]
continues to be the recognized sovereign power over that State and it
loses none of the rights and privileges appurtenant to recognition. Only
when that government ceases to exist, usually through a revolution or in
some other unconstitutional manner, does recognition terminate. The
executive then determines whether to grant recognition to the new head
of state or the new government. When the government is recognized by
the United States, all acts of that government preceding recognition are
validated. Recognition relates back to the origins of the previously un-
of a government is solely a political prerogative of the executive branch has been
criticized because recognition itself is somewhat artificial and because the execu-
tive department really possesses no special capacity to judge the "existence" of a
government. In the second place, the peculiarities of individual cases have de-
manded the bending of this purportedly absolute rule. For instance, political
nonrecognition has not always been an effective bar to suits against an unrecog-
nized government, to suits involving corporations controlled by unrecognized
governments, or to suits involving private affairs affected by the laws of unrecog-
nized governments.
Id. (footnotes ommitted) (emphasis in original).
The relationship between judiciary and executive has been considered in numerous articles.
See, e.g., Franck, The Courts, The State Department and National Iolicy. A Criteron forJudicial Abdica-
tion, 44 MINN. L. REv. 1101 (1960); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power ofthe Federal Courts: Sab-
batino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805 (1964); Lillich, The Proper Role ofthe Courts in the International
Legal Order, II VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1970); Moore, The Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceed-
ings, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 277 (1962).
16 Alder, supra note 9, at 36.
17 Nedjati, Acts of Unrecognized Governments, 30 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 388, 388 (1981).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Alder, supra note 9, at 37. See also I OPPENREIM, supra note 13, at 125-29.
23 Alder, supra note 9, at 37.
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recognized government. 24
The decision to recognize a foreign government that comes to power
through extra-constitutional means usually involves a subtle interplay
between the principles of international law and international politics.
2 5
Three major approaches have developed which reflect this interplay: (1)
the Traditional Approach; (2) the Estrada Doctrine; and (3) the Tobar,
or Betancourt, Doctrine.
2 6
If a-recognizing state utilizes the Traditional Approach, it will seek
to determine:
1. whether the government is in de facto control of the territory and in
possession of the machinery of the state;
2. whether the government has the consent of the people, without sub-
stantial resistance to its administration, that is, whether there is pub-
lic acquiescence in the authority of the government; and
3. whether the new government has indicated its willingness to comply
with its obligations under treaties and international law.
2 7
The first criterion for recognition in the Traditional Approach is
fundamental to all three approaches. 28 The second criterion is more con-
troversial and is usually interpreted as the acquiescence of the people to
the new government. 29 The third criterion originates in the practices of
the United States in the last half of the nineteenth century in dealings
with unstable Caribbean and Latin American states, and is largely a for-
malistic requirement.3 0 Once all three criteria have been met, the execu-
tive branch makes a political decision as to whether recognition would be
in the best interest of the recognizing state .3
The Estrada Doctrine was first espoused by a former Mexican
Foreign Minister, Don Genaro Estrada, in 1930.32 Under the Estrada
Doctrine, only new states are recognized, thereby eliminating the recogni-
tion of governments that come to power through extra-constitutional
means.33 Relations with outside states remain the same when a newgov-
24 Id. at 37 (footnotes ommitted).
25 L. GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 5 (1978).
26 Id. at 5.
27 Id. at 5-6 (quoting 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-73 (1963)).
28 Id. at 6.
29 Id. at 6-7.
30 Id. at 7. See also H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 8, at 109-114 (1947).
31 In making the decision the state will usually consider:
the existence or non-existence of evidence of foreign intervention in the establish-
ment of the new regime; the political orientation of the government and its lead-
ers; evidence of intention to observe democratic principles, particularly the
holding of elections; the attitude of the new government toward private invest-
ment and economic improvement. Importantly, also, the interest of peoples, as
distinguished from governments, is of concern. These, and other criteria, depend-
ing upon the international situation at the time, have been considered, with vary-
ing weight.
2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 73 (1963).
32 L. GALLOWAY, supra note 25, at 8.
33 In a speech, Estrada stated:
ITlhe Mexican government is issuing no declarations in the sense of grants of
recognition, since that nation considers that such a course is an insulting practice
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ernment comes to power through whatever means.3 4 The Estrada Doc-
trine follows the principle of unfettered national sovereignty and rejects
interference with the domestic affairs of one state by another through the
granting or withholding of recognition.3 5
The Tobar, or Betancourt Doctrine, was first developed by a For-
eign Minister of Ecuador. 36 The doctrine was embodied in a treaty
signed in 1907 by five Central American republics and stands in direct
contrast to the Estrada Doctrine.37 In attempting to encourage demo-
cratic and constitutional government, the doctrine refuses to recognize
any government that comes to power through extra-constitutional means
until a free election is held and new leaders are elected. 38 The Tobar
Doctrine is generally criticized for its substantial interference with the
domestic political processes of sovereign states, and because it bars revo-
lutionary change as a method to overthrow even corrupt and despotic
governments. 39
Instrumentalities of unrecognized nations ordinarily cannot obtain
access to U.S. courts.4° The leading case denying an unrecognized gov-
ernment access to U.S. courts is Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Repubhc v.
Cibrario ,41 where the court denied standing to the Soviet Government to
and one which, in addition to the fact that it offends the sovereignty of other
nations, implies that judgment of some sort may be passed upon the internal
affairs of those nations by other governments, inasmuch as the latter assume, in
effect, an attitude of criticism, when they decide, favorably or unfavorably, as to
the legal qualifications of foreign regimes.
Therefore, the Government of Mexico confines itself to the maintenance or
withdrawal, as it may deem advisable, of its diplomatic agents, and to the contin-
ued acceptance, also when it may deem advisable, of such similar accredited dip-
lomatic agents as the respective nations may have in Mexico; and in so doing, it
does not pronounce judgment, either precipitately or a posteriori, regarding the
right of foreign nations to accept, maintain or replace their governments or
authorities.
2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 8, at 85.
34 L. GALLOWAY, supra note 25, at 8.
35 Id. at 9.
36 Id. at 10.
37 Id.
38 Id. One writer has noted: "If the Estrada Doctrine mode of approach assumed auto-
matic recognition of new governments, then it might be said that, for practical purposes, the
Tobar Doctrine implied automatic nonrecognition." Needler, United States Recognition Poh'iy and
the Peruvian Case, INTER-AM. ECON. AFFs. 61, 67 (1963) (quoted in L. GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZ-
ING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 10 (1978)).
39 L. GALLOWAY, supra note 25, at 10.
40 See, e.g., Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139
N.E. 259 (1923).
41 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923). Cibrarto was not the first case to state the general rule
that unrecognized governments have no. standing to sue in a country's courts. In 1823, Lord
Chancellor Eldon stated: "What right have I, as the King's judge, to interfere upon the subject
of a contract with a country which he does not recognize." Jones v. Garcia Del Rio, 1 Turn. &
Rus. 297, 299, 37 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1114 (Ch. 1823). An earlier declaration of the rule may be
found in City of Berne in Switzerland v. The Bank of England, 9 Ves. 348, 32 Eng. Rep. 636
(Ch. 1804). The Hornet, 12 F. Cas. 529 (No. 6,705) (D.C.N.C. 1870) was the first United States
federal case on point. The rule was firmly established in the federal courts in the "Russian Ship
Cases," where the unrecognized Soviet government unsuccessfully attempted to secure posses-
sion of certain ships held by the defunct but still recognized Kerensky government. See The
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recover funds misappropriated by a Soviet Government purchasing
agent working in New York City. The court based its decision on com-
ity, "that reciprocal courtesy which one member of the family of nations
owes to the others," which could only be extended to other governments
by the executive act of recognition. 42 The Cibrario court stated that
to hold otherwise might tend to nullify the rule that public policy must
always prevail over comity .... [T]o permit . .. [the Soviet Govern-
ment] to recover in our courts funds which might tend to strengthen it or
which might even be used against our interests would be unwise. We
should do nothing to thwart the policy which the United States has
adopted.
4 3
There was no comity between the two states since the Russian Govern-
ment was not recognized by the United States. Therefore, the Russian
Government was not entitled to the privilege of suing in the courts of the
United States.4 4
Due to the harshness of the nonaccess rule, several exceptions have
been created by the courts. The defacto exception was first suggested in
United States v. Insurance Compani'es,45 a post-Civil War case involving two
insurance companies created by the Georgia legislature while Georgia
was not recognized by the Union.46 If the court had strictly followed the
nonaccess rule, the insurance companies should not have been allowed
access to the courts, but the Supreme Court sustained their standing to
sue, reasoning that Georgia had a defacto existence if not a dejure exist-
ence.4 7 The acts of the Georgia Legislature were given effect because
"[tlhey were mere ordinary legislation, such as might have been had
Penza, 277 F. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1921); The Rogdai, 278 F. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1920); The Rogdai, 279 F.
130 (N.D. Cal. 1920). See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 205 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981):
§ 205 Effect of Non-Recognition: Law of the United States
Under the Law of the United States:
(1) an entity not recognized as a state, or a regime not recognized as the
government of a state is ordinarily denied access to courts in the United
States ....
42 235 N.Y. at 258, 139 N.E. at 260. See Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 108,
34 A. 714, 716 (1895):
What is termed the comity of nations is the formal expression and ultimate result
of that mutual respect accorded throughout the civilized world by the representa-
tives of each sovereign power to those of every other, in considering the effects of
their official acts. Its source is a sentiment of reciprocal regard, founded on iden-
tity of position and similarity of institutions.
43 235 N.Y. at 263, 139 N.E. at 262.
44 Id. The Cibrario rule has been criticized because it may deal unfairly with an unrecog-
nized government. See, e.g., Alder, supra note 9, at 40. The absolute rule of Cibrarto has also
been criticized on other equitable grounds. See, e.g., JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS (1933); Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in Amertcan Courts, 26 AM. J. INT'L L.
261, 266 (1932); Dickensen, The Unrecognized Government or State in English and American Law, 22
MICH. L. REV. 29, 118, 123 (1923); Fraenkel, The Jurtstic Status of Foreign States, Their Property and
Their Acts, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 544, 551 (1925); Lubman, The Unrecognized Government in American
Courts.- Upright v. Mercuy Business Machines, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 275, 298-99 (1962).
45 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 99 (1874).
46 Id. at 99.
47 Id. at 101, 104.
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there been no war, or no attempted secession; such as is of yearly occur-
rance in all states of the Union."
'48
A more recent application of the defacto principle is presented by
Upright v. Mercury Business Machtnes Co. ,49 where the plaintiff was the as-
signee of a trade acceptance drawn on and accepted by the defendant as
payment for typewriters sold by a foreign corporation and delivered to
the defendant by the foreign corporation. The defendant alleged that
the foreign corporation was an instrumentality of the East German Gov-
ernment, which is not recognized by the United States, and therefore, the
assignee of the foreign corporation should not have been granted stand-
ing to sue in a U.S. court. 50 The court held the defense to be insufficient:
[I]t is insufficient for defendent merely to allege the nonrecognition of
the East German Government and that plaintiffs assignor was organ-
ized by and is an arm and instrumentality of such unrecognized East
German Government. The lack ofjural status for such government...
is not determinative of whether transactions with [the corporation] will
be denied enforcement in American courts, so long as the government is
not the suitor.51
The court used the defacto principle to arrive at its decision.52 The
court stated that although a government may be unrecognized, it may
nevertheless have defacto existence which is juridically cognizable, since
its acts, such as creating corporations, may affect private rights and obli-
gations arising either from activity in, or with persons or corporations
within, the territory controlled by such defacto government. 53 Since the
Upright court found no policy against trade with East Germany, and the
typewriters passed openly through U.S. customs, the court recognized
the acts upon which the plaintiffs claim rested.54 The defacto acts will
only be recognized so long as they are not inimical to the aims and pur-
poses of public or national policy.55 Thus, the defacto principle is utilized
when private litigants and rights are involved and there is little danger of
48 Id. at 103-04.
49 13 A.D.2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961).
50 Id. at -, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
51 Id. at -, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (footnote omitted).
52 Id. at -, 213 N.Y.S,2d at 419. The most notable expression of the defacto principle is
the formulation of the test by which the effect and validity of the enactments of the Confederate
States would be determined by the United States Supreme Court:
It may be said, perhaps with sufficient accuracy, that acts necessary to peace and
good order among citizens, such for example, as acts sanctioning and protecting
marriage and the domestic relations, governing the course of descents, regulating
the conveyance and transfer of property, real and personal, and providing reme-
dies for injuries to person and estate, and other similar acts, which would be valid
if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in general as valid
when proceeding from an actual, though [unrecognized] government ....
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 733 (1868).
53 13 A.D.2d at __, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 419. See also Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard,
240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925); M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186
N.E. 679 (1933); Alder, supra note 9, at 40.
54 13 A.D.2d at __, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24.
55 Id. See Alder, supra note 9, at 40-41.
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invading the domain of the political branch. 56
Another exception to the general rule of nonaccessibility is the "cor-
porate" or "separate juridical entity" exception. The "corporate" excep-
tion is closely related to the defacto exception. However, the "corporate"
exception is usually utilized when the foreign instrumentality involved in
the suit is either owned by the unrecognized government or is a branch
of the unrecognized government, 5 7 whereas the de facto exception in-
volves instrumentalities created by "mere ordinary legislation."'5 8
A decision utilizing the "corporate" exception is Am/org Trading Cor-
poration v. United States. 59 Amtorg, a New York corporation controlled by
the Soviet Government through stock ownership, was accused of dump-
ing products onto U.S. markets. 60 The Soviet Government was not rec-
ognized by the United States at the time, but the court refused to pierce
the corporate veil and recognize the Soviet control, resulting in Amtorg,
a corporation of an unrecognized government, being granted standing to
appeal in a U.S. court. 6 1
A more recent decision illustrating the application of the "corpo-
rate" exception is Federal Republic of Germany o. Elicofon 62 In Ecofon, the
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) brought an action
against Elicofon to recover several valuable paintings that were stolen
during World War 11.63 The Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar (Weimar
Art Collection), which had custody over the art collection from which
the paintings were stolen, sought leave to intervene in the suit.64 The
Weimar Art Collection is a juristic entity existing under the laws of the
German Democratic Republic (East Germany), a government unrecog-
nized by the United States.65 The Weimar Art Collection alleged that it
was a separate juristic entity by virtue of a decree issued by the Minister
of Culture of the German Democratic Republic. 66 The court ordered a
supplemental hearing to determine the status of the Weimar Art Collec-
tion after determining that the German Democratic Republic had no
standing to sue since it was unrecognized by the United States:
If, after a hearing, it is found that the Weimar Art Collection is an arm
56 See Alder, supra note 9, at 41.
57 See, e.g., Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
58 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
59 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
60 Id. at 527.
61 Id. at 527-28. Amtorg may be a less persuasive holding than Insurance Companies for the
"corporate," or "separate juridical entity," exception because Amtorg, although controlled
through stock ownership by an unrecognized government, was a corporation created within the
United States. The corporations in Insurance Companies were created by an unrecognized govern-
ment outside the United States that existed during the Civil War; however, they were granted
standing to sue.
62 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), afd, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 931 (1974).
63 358 F. Supp. at 749.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 750.
66 Id.
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or instrumentality of the [German Democratic Republic], the court will
have no choice but to hold that it too is barred from suit. On the other
hand, facts may be developed at the hearing which indicate that the
Weimar Art Collection is sufficiently independent of the [German Dem-
ocratic Republic] to be free of the latter's disability.6 7
The court filed a supplemental opinion analyzing the articles of in-
corporation of the Weimar Art Collection,68 and found that the property
of the Collection was nationally owned.6 9 Therefore, the court con-
cluded, the Weimar Art Collection was "performing a governmental
function as an arm and agency of the [German Democratic Republic]" 70
and was not free of the German Democratic Republic's disability.
71
However, if the Weimar Art Collection had been sufficiently independ-
ent of the German Democratic Republic, it might have fit into the "cor-
porate" exception.7 2 Thus, the "corporate" exception may be utilized
when an instrumentality owned by an unrecognized government is suffi-
ciently detached from the political nature of the state's actions.
When diplomatic relations have been severed with a recognized
government, the privilege of resorting to the courts of the United States
has not likewise been withdrawn. 73 In Banco Nacional v. Sabbalino,74 an
instrumentality of the Cuban Government brought suit against a com-
modities broker for conversion of bills of lading, and against a receiver
for certain injunctive relief. At the time of the suit, the United States
recognized Cuba; however, diplomatic relations had been severed. 75 The
respondents argued that the severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba
should close the courts of the United States to the Cuban Government,
but the Supreme Court did not agree and stated that "lacking some defi-
nite touchstone for determination, we are constrained to consider any
relationship, short of war, with a recognized sovereign power as embrac-
ing the privilege of resorting to United States courts."
76
The Court also discussed the executive's function of recognizing for-
eign governments and its significance when diplomatic relations are
severed:
It is perhaps true that nonrecognition of a government in certain cir-
cumstances may reflect no greater unfriendliness than the severance of
diplomatic relations with a recognized government, but the refusal to
recognize has a unique legal aspect. It signifies this country's unwilling-
ness to acknowledge that the government in question speaks as the sover-
eign authority for the territory it purports to control. Political recog-
67 Id. at 753.
68 Id. at 757-59.
69 Id. at 756.
70 Id.
71 See supra text accompanying note 69.
72 Se generally Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934);
United States v. Insurance Companies, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 99 (1874).
73 See 544 F. Supp. at 863. See generally supra text accompanying note 24.
74 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
75 See id. at 410.
76 Id.
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nition is exclusively a function of the Executive. Thepossible incongruity of
judt'acal "recognition, " by permitting suit of a government not recognzed by the Ex-
ecutive is completely absent when merely diplomatic relations are broken. 7
The Ronair court granted standing to an instrumentality of an un-
recognized foreign government while utilizing neither the defacto nor the
"corporate" exception to the general rule. Thus, the decision may repre-
sent the creation of a new exception to the general rule of nonaccess for
unrecognized foreign governments.
In Ronair, Ronair moved to dismiss, arguing that the court was with-
out jurisdiction to adjudicate the contract dispute and granting standing
to TAAG "would eliminate the fundamental political sanction of non-
recognition, and thus undermine the right of the executive branch to
control the foreign policy of the United States."' 78 TAAG raised four
arguments in response to Ronair's motion to dismiss. First, TAAG con-
tended that "recognition" is no longer used as a means of influencing
foreign regimes and has been abandoned by the Department of State for
all practical purposes, so that the judiciary should discontinue the prac-
tice of denying unrecognized governments standing to sue. 79 Second,
TAAG argued that the diversity jurisdiction statute80 draws no distinc-
tion between recognized and unrecognized governments, and therefore,
the court had jurisdiction. 8 1 Third, TAAG asserted that it must be con-
sidered apart from its parent country because it is a separate and distinct
juridical entity.8 2 Last, TAAG argued that since a commercial transac-
tion was involved in the suit, and since the Department of Commerce
had reflected its approval by issuing an export license for the Boeing
aircraft, fairness dictated that the suit proceed.83
In support of its first argument that the State Department has aban-
doned "recognition," TAAG introduced a letter from the State Depart-
ment stating that it would be consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests
to allow TAAG to have standing to prosecute its claim. 84 TAAG argued
77 Id. at 410-11 (emphasis supplied).
78 544 F. Supp. at 860.
79 Id.
80 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1976). For text of statute, see ita text accompanying note 88.
81 544 F. Supp. at 860.
82 Id. at 860-61.
83 Id. at 861.
84 The letter stated in pertinent part:
The United States does not maintain, and has never maintained diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of Angola. At the same time, the United
States Government has not discouraged trade between the United States and An-
gola. The volume of trade between the two countries in 1980 was $638.6 million,
making the United States one of Angola's largest trading partners. The Export-
Import Bank of the United States has granted substantial credits for U.S. exports
to Angola.
In these circumstances, the Department of State believes that allowing access
to U.S. courts by Angolan airline TAAG, a State-owned business enterprise, for
the resolution of a claim arising out of a purely commercial transaction, would be
consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United States.
d. at 861 [hereinafter cited as Letter].
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that by avoiding the use of the word "recognition," the letter signaled
"abandonment of the recognition dichotomy as a vehicle for exerting
pressure on foreign governments. '8 5 In addition, TAAG argued that
the State Department's position concerning the litigation should be
controlling.8
6
The court stated that the starting point in resolving the issue was the
diversity statute itself.8 7 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . ..
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff
and citizens of a State or of different States.
8 8
Section 1603 states:
(a) A "foreign state" .. includes a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in
subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as de-
fined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the
laws of any third country.
8 9
The court conceded that TAAG may be a separate corporate entity
for purposes of section 1603(a), 90 thus opening the door to the "corpo-
rate" exception to the nonaccess rule. 91 Rather than utilizing the excep-
tion, however, the court discussed section 1603 in light of the federal
common law principles in existence at the time of the section's adop-
tion.9 2 The court noted that dejure or defacto recognition is a function of
the executive, 93 and that the general rule provides that unrecognized
governments are denied access to U.S. courts. 9 4 Moreover, the court
stated, the nonaccess rule has been affirmed despite the commercial reali-
ties of current international affairs.
9 5
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1976).
89 Id. § 1603(a)-(b).
90 544 F. Supp. at 862.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 59-72.
92 544 F. Supp. at 862.
93 See id. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964);
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955); Jones v. United States, 137
U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
94 See 544 F. Supp. at 862. Seegenerally Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1978);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938).
95 See 544 F. Supp. at 862. The district court did not define commercial realities; however,
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In its discussion of Ronair's motion to dismiss, the court noted the
two exceptions to the nonaccess rule. 96 The court stated that, even
though wholly owned by the Angolan government, TAAG may well be a
discrete and independent entity.9 7 However, the court stated that it
need not examine whether TAAG was a separate entity because there
existed a more compelling reason why TAAG should be allowed
standing. 98
The court noted that ordinarily the executive is steadfastly opposed
to an unrecognized government being granted access to U.S. courts:
In this case, however, not only did the Department of Commerce, in
consultation with the Department of State, place its imprimatur on
TAAG's commercial dealings with Ronair by issuing a license to export
the Boeing aircraft to Angola for TAAG's use, but the State Department
itself has unequivocally stated that allowing TAAG access to this Court
would be consistent with foreign policy interests of the United States.
9 9
Relying on the State Department letter was not necessarily inconsis-
tent with the constitutional and policy underpinnings of the general rule
of nonaccess, since recognized foreign nations have long had standing in
U.S. courts. 00 In Ronair, the letter may have served the purpose of rec-
ognition. To this end the court stated:
[T]he purpose of denying the privilege of suit to governments not recog-
nized by the executive branch is solely to give full effect to that branch's
sensitive political judgments. Thus, where the executive branch, either
by its actions or words, evinces a definite desire to remove the impedi-
ment to a suit brought by an unrecognized government, or an instru-
mentality thereof, that determination necessarily frees this Court from
any strictures placed on the exercise of its jurisdiction. "01
Had the Ronair court analyzed the case in light of the recognized
exceptions to the nonaccess principle, rather than relying on the State
Department letter, the court might still have found that TAAG should
be allowed standing. Angola, although not recognized by the United
States, may still have defacto status which is juridically cognizable. 10 2
The letter from the State Department lends credence to the argument
in light of the present case, one could surmise that in the commercial realities of current interna-
tional affairs, corporate entities transacting business usually do not consider that they might not
be granted access to a foreign court when they have been wronged.
96 Id. at 863.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. The court also stated:
Arguably, the Department of Commerce's act in permitting Ronair to transact
business with TAAG could in itself be considered a grant of standing to litigate
any claim arising out of that transaction in the courts of the United States. Con-
sidered in conjunction with the express assertion by the State Department that
this case should be allowed to proceed, any lingering obstacles to this suit have
been conclusively removed.
Id. (citation omitted). See generalo, Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747,
752 n.4 (1972).
100 See 544 F. Supp. at 863.
10l Id. See also Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. at 318-19.
102 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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that Angola had a defacto government, since the United States actively
traded with the Angolan government. 0 3 In addition, the letter provides
evidence that there was no policy against trade with Angola.10 4 More-
over, TAAG may have been a "discrete and independent entity"'1 5 cre-
ated by "mere ordinary legislation"' 1 6 that affected private rights and
obligations. 0 7 Arguably, however, a strict application of the defacto ex-
ception would exclude TAAG because the de facto exception generally
applies only to private parties, not to government-owned entities like
TAAG.108
The "corporate," or "separate juridical entity,"' 0 9 exception might
have applied because, although wholly owned by the Angolan govern-
ment, TAAG might have been a "discrete and independent entity' ' 10
sufficiently detached from the political nature of the Angolan govern-
ment. The State Department letter characterizing the sale of the aircraft
as a "purely commercial transaction"' I lends support to the argument
that TAAG was sufficiently detached from the political nature of the
Angolan government.
Even though the court did not utilize the recognized exceptions to
the general rule of nonaccess, Ronai'r was fairly decided. TAAG may
have been defrauded by several U.S. corporations, and in the interest of
fairness, should have been allowed to pursue its claim in a U.S. court.' 2
TAAG was involved in a "purely commercial transaction"' 13 and had a
license from the U.S. Department of Commerce to purchase the aircraft;
therefore, TAAG could reasonably have expected that a U.S. court
would be available in which it could litigate a dispute involving the com-
mercial transaction. One commentator has noted that "[i]t seems neither
equitable to permit, and even help, an unrecognized government to
bring funds into the United States and then refuse it a remedy when,
according to United States law, a wrong is committed against them, nor
equitable to allow a wrongdoer to unjustly enrich himself."'"14
By choosing not to analyze Ronai'r in light of the recognized excep-
tions to the rule of nonaccess for unrecognized governments and their
instrumentalities, the court seems to have created a "new exception" to
the rule. Under the "new exception," if the executive branch of the
United States Government takes the position that a suit would not vio-
103 See Letter, supra note 84.
104 Id. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
105 544 F. Supp. at 863.
106 Insurance Companies, 89 U.S. at 103. See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
108 See supra notes 53, 56 and accompanying text.
109 See generally supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
110 544 F.2d at 863.
M Letter, supra note 84.
112 See generally Alder, supra note 9, at 40-41.
113 Letter, supra note 84.
114 Alder, supra note 9, at 40.
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late the foreign policy of the United States, then the suit should be al-
lowed to continue. However, the "new exception" is not really new; it is
simply a reflection of the policy behind the nonaccess rule.
The executive has the exclusive authority to recognize foreign sover-
eigns. 115 To avoid infringing upon the executive's political judgments,
U.S. courts are precluded from determining or affecting recognition of a
foreign state or government.1 16 However, when the State Department
has placed its "imprimatur" upon a commercial deal involving an instru-
mentality of an unrecognized foreign sovereign and has unequivocally
stated that allowing the instrumentality access to a U.S. court would be
consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests,"' 7 the "possible incongruity
of judicial 'recognition' "118 no longer exists. The court has not usurped
the recognition power of the executive because the executive has made
the political judgment. Therefore, the Ronair court's decision to grant
TAAG standing to sue was consistent with the policy behind the rule
excluding unrecognized foreign sovereigns from U.S. courts.
Although a letter may not be forthcoming from the State Depart-
ment for every instrumentality of an unrecognized foreign government,
future plaintiffs should be encouraged by the Ronair court's willingness to
look behind the nonaccess rule to the policy of recognition. Future
courts, facing similar facts, might now be more willing to follow the same
path.
-RICHARD C. BELTHOFF, JR.
115 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
116 See Alder, supra note 9, at 36.
117 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
118 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410. See also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
